










   
 
 
         
       
                




       
 




    
 




                 
             
               
 
 
      
 
      
 
             
           
 
       
 




     Primer on Nuclear Exchange ModelsDavid HafemeisterPhysics Department
 Cal Poly University
 San Luis Obispo, California
 Abstract. Basic physics is applied to nuclear force exchange models between two nations. Ultimately, thisscenario approach can be used to try and answer the age old question of “how much is enough?” This work is based on Chapter 2 of Physics of Societal Issues: Calculations on National Security, Environment andEnergy (Springer, 2007 and 2014). FLAT EARTHThe range of a parabolic missile flight isX = v2 sin(2θ)/g = (104 m/sec)2 sin(60o)/(9.8 m/sec2) = 8800 km, (1)with a flight time oft = 2v sin(30o) = 103 sec = 20 min,close to the flight time of ICBMs that travel ¼ the Earth’s circumference of 10,000 km. (2)SPHERICAL EARTHElliptical orbits are relatively easy to use, but calculations are more complex when one considers optimum launchangle, gravitational bias error for the non-spherical Earth with concentrated mass (mascons), variable drag forces,and variable rocket thrust. Trajectories can be obtained by Runge Kutta numerical integrations of the basicequations:d2r/dt2 - r (dθ/dt)2 = –GM/r2 , (3)d/dt (r2 dθ/dt) = 0. (4)The equations in x and y are easier to solve than with those with r and θ (RE is the Earth’s radius). The equations canbe modified for variable thrust, drag forces, the non-spherical Earth, and so forth:d2x/dt2 = –x(gRE 2)/(x2 + y2)3/2 + Fother/m, (5)d2y/dt2 = –y(gRE 2)/(x2 + y2)3/2 + Fother/m. (6)ICBM ACCURACYThe accuracy of a ballistic missile is determined from the following errors:Nuclear Weapon Issues in the 21st CenturyAIP Conf. Proc. 1596, 32-38 (2014); doi: 10.1063/1.4876435© 2014 AIP Publishing LLC 978-0-7354-1230-9/$30.00 32 
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(1) terminal velocity Δv = 0.5 x 10-5v = 0.5 x 10–5(104 m/sec) = 0.05 m/sec, (7)
(2) range, vertical angular error 10–5θ = (10–5)(0.5 radian) = 0.5 x 10–5 radian, (8)
(3) tracking azimuthal error Δφ = 10–5 radian. (9)
The range error ΔX is the product of the fractional range error (ΔX/X) times the range X:
ΔX= [2(Δv/v) + 2[Δθ/tan(2θ)] + (Δg/g)]X. (10)
Using the above values, the range error over the 8800-km range from the velocity error Δv/v is
ΔX = 2(Δv/v)X = [2(0.05/104)](8.8 x 106 m) = 88 m. (11)
The range error from error in the vertical angle Δθ is a second order correction when launching at the minimum
energy angle of θmin = 22o above the horizon for 10,000-km range flights above round Earth. Since we are not at that
angle, the range error is
ΔX = 2[Δθ/tan(2θ)]X = [2(0.5 x 10–5 radian)/tan60o](8.8 x 106 m) = 51 m. (12)
If these are random errors, the combined range error is
σx = (882 + 512)1/2 = 102 m. (13)
If the errors were systematic, the total error could be as large as 139 m. The error in azimuthal angle Δφ gives rise to
an error in the tracking direction,
ΔY = (Δφ)X = (10–5)(8.8 x 106 m) = 88 m. (14)
The radial error from the aim point is obtained by combining the range and tracking errors,
σtotal = (1012 + 882)1/2 = 130 m. (15)
NONSPHERICAL EARTH GRAVITATIONAL BIAS
US and Soviet-Russian ICBMs are intended to travel near the North Pole. Because Earth's polar radius is 21 km
(0.3%) smaller than its equatorial radius, guidance computers must take into account the nonspherical Earth. Highly 
accurate three-dimensional, gravitational multipole-potentials were developed for the Earth by observing variations
in satellite orbits. When a satellite approaches a concentrated extra mass, the satellite speeds up slightly and it slows
after it passes the mass concentration. Corrections for local gravity at launch sites are important, since slowly rising
missiles spend more time near the modified gravitational force.
We consider only the quadrapole term with a simplified approach that uses Δg/g to determine the gravitational
bias error. To first order, the fractional change in g is proportional to the fractional change in Earth radius, or
Δg/g ≈ ΔRE/RE = 0.003. (16)
Because missiles take off and land at about 40o north latitude, far from the equator, the estimate of the bias error is
reduced by a factor of about 3; that is
ΔX = (Δg/3g)X = (10-3)(8.8 x 106 m) ≈ 15 km, (17)
which agrees with accurate estimates. Guidance computers must calculate gravitational bias corrections to better  
than 1% accuracy because a 15-km error is 100 times larger than 100-m accuracy. The conventional wisdom is that
guidance computers can do this calculation. 33 




                 
              
          
       
 
    
 
                
               
        
        
 
 
   
  
    
  
                    
                 
            
    
 
    
 
    
  
 




                
             
 
        
 
   
                   
                
   
                
          
                  
              
                 





                    
                   
                     
KILL PROBABILITY = f(CEP, H, Y, R, n, fratricide)
The "cookie cutter" approximation assumes that a target is destroyed if overpressure exceeds the hardness of the
target but it survives if the overpressure is less than the hardness. Reality expects that the step function, cookie cutter
probability, which is either 0 or 1, should be smoothed. A two-dimensional Gaussian kill probability density 
function describes missiles impacting a distance r from a target, 
p(r) = (1/2πσ2) exp(–r2/2σ2). (18)
In practice the footprint of landing missiles is an ellipse, but we will treat it as a circle. If gravitational bias exists, r
should be replaced by the vector (r – B). By integrating p(r) from r = 0 to CEP and setting the integrated single-shot
kill probability (SSKP) to 0.5, it is shown that CEP = 1.18σ.  The relation between pressure p and yield Y is obtained 
by numerically fitting the empirical data as a function of distance r in Glasstone and Dolan1 
1 
3) 0.5p= 14.7(Y/r3) +12.8(Y/r   (in psi, megaton, nautical miles (1860 m), (19)
3) 0.5p= 6.3(Y/r3) +2.20(Y/r   (in atmospheres, megaton, km). (20)
The first term is sufficiently accurate for small distances when attacking silos, but it is not accurate for the greater
distances of cities. At close distances the pressure falls with the third power of distance, two powers from geometry
and one because the blast pulse width broadens proportional to distance. Using this connection gives the single shot
kill probability of warhead destroying a hardened facility.2 
SSKP = 1 – exp(–Y2/3/0.22H2/3CEP2), (21)
where Y is in Mton, H is in psi and CEP is in nautical miles (1860 m). The kill probability for one warhead takes
into account reliability of the missile-warhead system,
Pkill-1 = R x SSKP. (22)
ACCURACY vs. YIELD
A 1-Mton warhead has an SSKP of 90% against a target. By how much can yield be reduced if accuracy is improved
by a factor of 2, while retaining the same SSKP? Using a fixed SSKP argument with H1 = H2 gives
(Y1/Y2)2/3 = (CEP1/CEP2)2 and  (Y1/Y2) = (CEP1/CEP2)3 . (23)
Thus, a CEP reduced by a factor of 2 allows the yield to be reduced by a factor of 8. For our example, this gives a
reduced yield of (1/2)3(1 Mton) = 1/8 Mton. US weapon yield was reduced as accuracy was improved by a factor of
4 as Minuteman II (0.2 nmi = 370 m) was replaced with Peacekeeper (0.05 nmi = 90 m). The reduction by a factor
of 4 in CEP implies that yield could be reduced by 43 = 64, but yield was in fact reduced only by a factor of 4 from
Minuteman-II to Peacekeeper. The cause of the difference between ratios of 4 and 64 is that the Peacekeeper was
designed for harder silos and in an era when higher kill probabilities were sought.
The Soviets always had larger weapons because Soviet accuracy was always surpassed by the US. Even today,
the reported accuracy of the SS-18 (0.13 nmi) is about 1/3 that of Peacekeeper's 0.05 nmi. In Senate hearings on 
SALT, much was made of the large size of Soviet SS-9s as compared to US Minuteman. Senators misled the public
by showing large models of Soviet missiles emphasizing launch-weight and yield, but they neglected the two most
important parameters, accuracy and reliability.
ACCURACY vs. HARDNESS
As US accuracy increased, the Soviets moved their ICBMs from launch pads to silos with 300 psi hardness, then to
silos with 2000 psi hardness and finally to some silos with a hardness over 5000 psi. During this period US accuracy
improved from 1300 m in 1962 to 300 m in 1970 to 90 m in 1986. It is generally accepted that accuracy won the34 
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race against hardness. Perhaps super-hardened silos might be able to withstand 20,000 psi, but the cost would  
become very large. In addition, when crater size becomes similar to CEP, the kill mechanism becomes cratering, and
not overpressure. US hard-target warheads can produce craters with radii approaching their accuracy.
Relative Constancy of Hard-Target Yield. The US and Russia maintain warheads of about one-half Mton for
their hard-target weapons. The record was set with the test of the Soviet’s 58-Mton weapon in 1962, which was later
reported to be but a part of a 100–150 Mton weapon. These parameters are consensus numbers from the
International Institute for Strategic Studies.
RELIABILITY vs. SSKP
Warhead accuracy requires many tasks be carried out reliably. The total reliability of a ballistic missile is the
product of the reliabilities for command-control-communication-intelligence (C3I) reliability, missile reliability, and
warhead reliability:
Rtotal = RC3I x Rmissile x Rwarhead. (24)
The US Congressional Budget Office quoted a reliability of 85% for US ICBMs. It is generally believed that
warheads have a high reliability of greater than 95%, higher than the reliability of the missiles that carry them. The
ratio of missile-to-warhead failure rates (F) is, perhaps, a factor of 3, from these reliabilities:
Fmissile/Fwarhead = (1 – Rmissile)/(1 – Rwarhead) = (1 – 0.85)/(1 – 0.95) = 3. (25)
Consider the case where high-yield, accurate missiles have SSKP ≈ 1. The survival probability is 1 – Pkill-1 = 1 – R. 
For hard-target weapons (Peacekeeper, Trident/W88, SS-18, SS-27), the number of surviving targets is essentially 
determined by the reliability of the attacking system.
RATE OF CHANGE IN Pkill-1
Parameter changes affect kill probabilities. It is useful to take the differential of the single warhead kill probability
Pkill-1:
Pkill-1 = R(1 – e – α), (26)
where α = Y2/3/(0.22 CEP2 H2/3), to obtain
ΔPkill-1/Pkill-1 = ΔR/R + (2α/3)[ΔY/Y – ΔH/H – 3(ΔCEP/CEP)]/(eα – 1). (27)
TABLE 1. Improvements from enhanced R, Y, H, and CEP. Improvements in one-warhead kill probability, ΔPkill-1/Pkill-1, from
10% improved reliability, yield, hardness, and accuracy for two situations.
Attacker Y(Mt) H(psi) CEP(nmi) R L Pk1 Pk2 ΔPk1/Pk1(%): R Y or H CEP
A 0.75 2000 0.135 0.85 45 62% 85% 10% 3.3% 9.8%
 
B 0.5 2000 0.05 0.9 252 89.9% 99% 10% 0.04% 0.1%
 
It takes two A-warheads to accomplish what B can do with one. It follows that A improves its one-warhead kill
probability more with 10% improvements than 10% improvements for B. For A, 10% improvements in reliability 
(DR/R = 0.1) and accuracy (DCEP/CEP = 0.1) gives 10% improvements in Pkill-1, while a 10% yield increase (DY/Y
= 0.1) raises Pkill-1 by 3.3%. For B, which has much better accuracy, 10% improvement increase Pkill-1 by 10% for
reliability, 0.04% for yield and 0.1% for CEP. 35 




          
 
         
 
                  
    
 
               
 
      
 
       
 
                   
                   
        
                 
     
 




               
         
     
     
 
         
 
      
 
          
 
              
 
               
   
 
     
 
            
                     
            
           
               
           
       
           
   
 
 
TWO WARHEADS PER TARGET
 
The survival probability for one warhead attacking a silo is
Psurvive-1 = 1 – Pkill-1 = 1 – R x SSKP. (28)
If two warheads with the same parameters, but coming from different missiles, attack a silo, the survival probability
is multiplicative, since the launches are independent actions,
Psurvive-2 = (1 – R x SSKP)(1 – R x SSKP) = (1 – R x SSKP)2 , (29)
with a total kill probability of
Pkill-2 = 1 – (1 – R x SSKP)2 . (30)
Since missile reliability is the most likely failure mode, warheads from different missiles are used to target a
silo. A failure of a missile carrying two warheads for one target would cause both the first and second warheads to
fail. For the case of SSKP = 1 and Rmissile = 0.8, 80% of the silos would be destroyed and 20% would survive, since
second warheads fail with the first failure. If different missiles were used for the two warheads, the kill probability
would be raised to 96%:
Pkill-2  = 1 – (1 – 0.8)2 = 1 – (0.2)2 = 96%, and Psurvive-2 = 4%. (31)
FRATRICIDE
There are many mechanisms that cause fratricide, the killing of one warhead by another: Blast waves and dust can
 
destroy the second warhead; an electromagnetic pulse from the first warhead can destroy the second warhead’s
 
electronics; and neutrons from the first warhead can preheat or pre-initiate the second warhead.
 
For the case of no fratricide,
 
Pkill-2 = 1 – (1 – R x SSKP)2 = (2R x SSKP) – (R2 x SSKP2). (32)
We consider three fratricide situations:
(1) The first warhead destroys the target with a probability of R x SSKP. 
(2) The first warhead misses the target, but destroys the second warhead with reliability R. 
(3) The first warhead misses the target, but does not destroy the second warhead. For simplicity, we consider 
completely effective fratricide and ignore the third possibility to obtain
Pkill-2-fratricide = (2R x SSKP) – (R2 x SSKP). (33)
This result slightly differs from Pkill-2. For very reliable and lethal weapons (R = 1, SSKP = 1), fratricide is irrelevant
since it takes only one reliable warhead to destroy a silo. However, if reliability is not 1, but the weapons are very
lethal with SSKP = 1, then two-shot kill probability with fratricide and without fratricide reduces to the same
answer, Pkill-2-fratricide = 2R – R2 = Pkill-2. However, when SSKP is not 1 there is a marked difference. In Figure 1 we
plot, as an example, the number of surviving silos as a function of accuracy using the above equations for Pkill-2 and
Pkill-2-fratricide. Accuracy is varied while yield and reliability remain fixed. The curves with and without fratricide
coincide for accuracy better than 0.06 nautical mile since SSKP approaches 1 at that point, but they separate for  
larger CEPs. The shaded area indicates that, at most, 100 additional silos in 1990 (10% of 1000) could survive  
because of fratricide. 36 
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FIGURE 1. Fratricide. The number
of silos that survive calculated as
a function of accuracy for two
situations: (a) no fratricide and (b)
totally effective fratricide when a
first warhead misses a target and
destroys a second warhead.
Totally effective fratricide
increases the number of surviving
silos by about 10%. These kinds 
of discussions should include the
survivable submarine fleet.
[Hafemeister, Amer. Jour. Physics
51, 215 (1983)]
MORE THAN TWO WARHEADS PER TARGET
By simple extension, the n-shot kill probabilities is
Pkill-n = 1 – (1 – R x SSKP)n = 1 – (1 – Pkill-1)n . (34)
It does not make great technical sense to use a third warhead on a target when the marginal return is small or when
fratricide is increased. For the case of good hard-target weapons, Pkill-1 is about 0.9. A second warhead makes an  
improvement to Pkill-2 = 0.99, but a third warhead gives only marginal improvement at Pkill-3 = 0.999. This argument is
weakened if Pkill-1 is low, say Pkill-1 = 0.5, giving Pkill-2 = 0.75 and Pkill-3 = 0.875. In this case improvements with each
additional warhead is larger. Government calculations using conjectured three-warhead targeting by the Soviets were
used in Senate testimony by those trying to show vulnerability of US systems.
HOW MANY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS ENOUGH?
These estimates are usually based on worst-case-analysis. One usually assumes that these very complicated attacks
go as planned. Two–warhead targeting of hardened silos is based on the use of accurate timing to avoid fratricide
and other issues. Political debates don’t allow arguments that nay-say foreign prowess by saying they are not that
competent. But even with worst–case analysis, it easily shown that there is sufficient second-strike prowess 
remaining after a full-throated attack to deter a sensible attacker. We briefly discuss three types of analysis, from
very simple to more complex.
An equation for the Senate: The size of the future US arsenal was an issue for the ratification of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaties. In 1992, the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee estimated the minimum number of37 
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surviving warheads after a brutal attack3 In 1992, it was generally assumed that U.S. nuclear forces under START-1 
forces would consist of the following: 
 1400 warheads on ICBMs,
 3456 warheads on SLBMs and 
 3700 warheads on heavy bombers, for a total of 8500.
The total number of 8500 is gargantuan, much larger than today’s number of about 1700. The Senate START-1 
report has the following equation for surviving warheads (WHsurvive).
WHsurvive = ICBM (1400 x 0.1–0.2) + SLBM (3456 x 0.65) = + Heavy Bombers (3700 x 0.3)
= 200 + 2300 + 1100 = 3500 warheads. (35)
Shortly after START ratification, the US and the Russian Federation agreed on 3500 for the START-2 limit, a
50%reduction from the START-1 limit. On June 26, 1992, General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, testified the following:
We are not dueling with each other, my warhead against your warhead. The question is, does the Untied 
States force structure give us enough capability to deliver a devastating blow against any nuclear State that
may choose to attack us? It if does, then that is a deterrent to that nuclear State ever contemplating such an 
action.
More Equations:  Barb Levi and I derived the following equations to describe an attack by red on blue’s four types
of warheads (WH): silos (l), SLBMs (s), bombers (a) and mobile missiles (m):4
WHused(red) = 2Ll(blue) + 2Bs(blue) + 16Ba(blue) + MLm(blue), (36)
and
WHdestroyed(blue) = [1 – (1–R x SSKP)2] x WHl(blue) + [1–(1 –R)2] x [(1 – fs) x WHs(blue) +
(1–fa) x Wa(blue)] + R x (M x A)/AD x Wm(blue). (37)
L is the number of missile (s or m) launchers carrying a total of WH warheads, B is the number of bomber bases or
SLBM ports, M is the number of warheads dedicated to attacking each mobile missile with devastation area A per
warhead, AD is the total mobile dispersal area, f is the fraction of bombers or submarines (a or s) on alert, SSKP is
the single-shot-kill probability, R is reliability.
Exchange Models: Some models lay down the attacking warheads in a way that maximizes the destruction of
warheads by choosing which warhead types to attack the various targets.  One such model was called the Price to
Attack. Such an application was carried out by Steinbruner, Bing and May.5 
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